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The issues raised in this appeal of an action for specific performance of an option are whether parol evidence was admissible to
show that the consideration stated in the option ("$5,000.00 and other
good and valuable consideration") was not intended to be paid, and
whether critical parts of this evidence were inadmissible on other
grounds as well.
With regard to the parol evidence question, Respondent's Brief
asserts, first, that the parol evidence rule does not prevent inquiry
into the "real" consideration for an agreement which does not contain
a contractual statement of consideration, and, second, that consideration for the option in this case may be found in the real estate
contract and certificate of limited partnership with which it is
"integrated".

Respondent apparently disavows any claim that parol was

admissible in this case to show that the real estate contract and
option were intended to constitute a loan secured with realty, with a
right to retrieve the security upon "repaying" the "loan", thus admitting that Respondent did not meet the evidentiary requirements of such
a claim.
Apart from the parol evidence question, Respondent claims that
the option was enforceable because, though the $5,000.00 was never
paid, "other good and valuable consideration" was given, and, in any
case, because the option contains an acknowledgment of receipt, appellants are promisorily estopped to assert a lack of consideration.
Respondent includes a highly partisan "Statement of Facts" which,
it will be observed, is almost entirely unsupported by Respondents1
citations to the record.

It will also be observed that the bulk of

these "facts" are parol matters, to which it is unnecessary to respond

1

absent some showing that parol was admissible to establish such
"facts".
Finally, Respondent defends the District Courtfs reliance on
certain "notes" and an appraisal.
Respondents arguments on matters other than the parol evidence
question can be addressed quickly before turning to the parol question
and the particular evidentiary questions.

The Statement of Facts
Respondent has attempted to predispose reaction to its argument
by prefacing it with a highly colored "Statement of Facts".

The Court

should be advised that a number of critical "facts" asserted there by
Respondent are essentially unsupported by the included references to
the record.

Notable examples include the statements that appellants

"advised Colman that they were only interested in advancing Colman
$500,000.00 total for his salt project, and only on condition that the
$500,000.00 be structured to appear by written record as (1) an investment of $250,000.00 in a limited partnership on the salt project... and (2) a payment of $250,000.00 as the purchase price for the
Anderson Ranch, coupled with ei one-year option in Colman" (p. 3,
Respondent's Brief), that "Allen was advised by Archer, Wolfe and
Colman that, although the primary purpose of the arrangement was to
get $500,000.00 to Colman... they wanted the deal structured such that
it would appear as three separate transactions (i.e., the limited
partnership, the purchase of the ranch, and the option back to Colman
on the ranch)" (pp. 3-4, Respondent's Brief); that Colman only agreed
to the structure demanded by cippellants "so long as he had an opportunity to reacquire the Anderson Ranch" (p. 4, Respondent's Brief),
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that "Appellants intended that Colman and his attorney should rely on
these representations and upon the sufficiency of the Option, as
executed; and Colman did so rely and granted Appellants a deed to the
Anderson Ranch" (p. 7, Respondent's Brief); and that "Allen consistently advised anyone who asked that the parties to the Option never
intended for Colman to pay the $5,000.00" (p. 7, Respondent's Brief).
Without multiplying examples, examination of Respondent's record citations in support of these propositions demonstrates that the vast
majority of the material cited does not even reference the subject
I
matter of the alleged "facts", and that actual references are few and
where not equivocal are directly contradictory of the alleged "facts".
Appellants simply ask that the Court observe critically the
relationship of the cited evidence to the recited "facts".

As the

illustrative examples noted above mirror actual findings by the District Court, examination of the supporting evidence cited by Respondent will provide the Court a thumbnail view of the quality of evidence
supporting the District Court's Judgment.

The "Dual-Consideration" Argument
For the proposition that "other good and valuable consideration"
will support enforcement of the option in this case even though the
$5,000.00 was never paid, Respondent relies upon cases that hold that
where two considerations are agreed upon, the fact that one is inadequate will not defeat the agreement if the other is adequate and
legal.

See Luther v. Nat'1 Bank of Commerce, 98 P.2d 667 (Wash.

1940); U.S. v^ Schaefer, 319 F.2d 907 (9 Cir. 1963).
The difficulty with these cases for Respondent is that they hold
unequivocally that all legal considerations agreed upon must be de-
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livered, however inadequate, to preserve the agreement.

See Luther,

supra, 98 P.2d at 673,

They do not

citing Williston on Contracts.

support the proposition wished for by Respondent that where two considerations are agreed upon, delivery of one will suffice.
In any case, no witness in this matter intimated that there were
two considerations for the subject option:

one said the phrase

"$5,000.00 and other good and valuable consideration" was "short-hand"
for something else; three said it meant $5,000.00.

No one claimed

that $5,000.00 was an illegal or inadequate consideration.
The answer to Respondent's claim about "dual consideration",
therefore, is that the option did not provide for a dual consideration; even if it had, the cases relied upon by Respondent would require the delivery of both, the $5,000.00 and whatever else might be
thought to have been agreed upon.

The "Promissory Estoppel" Argument
The law of Utah is simply that an acknowledgment of receipt does
not prevent a showing that, in fact, the consideration was not paid.
Nielsen v^ MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah, 1982); FMA Financial
Corp. v^ Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah, 1980).

Such an

acknowledgment is not a promise upon which an estoppel may be based.
Moreover, it is admitted in this case that there was no reliance
on any such promise.

Appellants admittedly warned Colman repeatedly

from the date the $5,000.00 was first due up to the date for exercise
of the option that the $5,000.00 had not been paid and that the option
was considered invalid as a result.

Respondent chose to rely upon a

claim of Colman's lawyer that the $5,000.00 did not have to be paid.
It is absurd to suggest that Respondent relied to his detriment on a
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representation of appellants that the $5,000.00 had been paid.

The Parol Evidence Problem
The indisputable, and undisputed, facts in this case include:
1.

the subject documents;

2.

the fact that appellants required the transactions to be

structured as shown by the documents, for legitimate and important tax
reasons, and would not have entered into the transactions otherwise;
specifically, that appellants refused to consumate the transactions as
a secured loan; and
3.

that the $5,000.00 recited as consideration for the option

was never paid.
The subject documents show on their face that:
cO

on October 15, 1981, appellants John Archer and Elliott

Wolfe entered into a limited partnership agreement with Owanah Oil
Company, represented by William Colman, in which Archer and Wolfe gave
$250,000.00 in return for certain royalties and a promise to expend
the money in a manner permitting tax credits;
b)

on November 9, 1981, appellants John and Elizabeth Archer,

the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust, and the Elliott Wolfe Trust No. 701
agreed to purchase from Royalty Investment Company, represented by
Colman, the Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00; and
c)

as of "March

, 1982", Mr. and Mrs. Archer and Elliott

Wolfe signed an option, for "$5,000.00 and other good and valuable
consideration", to William Colman to purchase the Anderson Ranch for
$650,000.00 on or before July 2, 1984.
Respondent, based upon the testimony of Frank Allen, claims that,
despite the face of the documents, the "real" arrangement between
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appellants and Colman was that appellants would provide Colman
$500,000,00, Colman would give appellants a deed to the Anderson
Ranch, and Colman, without further consideration, would obtain a right
to get the ranch back after 1% years by repaying appellants the
$500,000.00 plus 20% interest.

Notwithstanding Respondent's present

denial, his claim throughout this matter has been nothing more or less
than that the transaction between appellants and Colman was a loan
secured by the Anderson Ranch, and that Colman had the right to redeem
the security by repaying the loan.
The reason for Respondent's present denial of the claim announced
in his opening statement and pursued throughout the trial is that, in
post-trial memoranda, Respondent discovered that, as an exception to
the parol evidence rule, the claim that documents on their face an
absolute sale are in fact a secured loan must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, including evidence that both parties regarded the
transaction as a loan.

The record in this case is simply devoid of

any evidence that appellants ever thought their arrangements with
Colman a loan, or that they thought Colman had a right to retrieve the
ranch without exercise of the Option, or that they indicated at any
time that the $5,000.00 was not collectible, or that anyone in the
course of the subject transactions ever suggested that "$5,000.00 and
other good and valuable consideration" in the Option meant anything
but $5,000.00.

Realizing that the evidence in this case does not

begin to meet the applicable standard, Respondent now denies that the
basis of the ruling is a claim that the subject transaction was a
secured loan.

Respondent fails to note that the same evidentiary

requirements would apply, whatever his theory, since this is an action
for specific performance of an oral agreement.
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Respondent now attempts instead to show that the District Courtfs
reliance on parol evidence was justified as a search for the "real
consideration" for the option.

"Real" Cons iderat ion
Where the consideration is not stated in an agreement - either
because no mention is made of consideration or because the language
used is a "mere receipt" - the law allows resort to parol to show that
something of value which passes between the parties contemporaneously
is the consideration.

See Neilsen v. MFT Leasing, supra.; Wood v.

Roberts, 586 P.2d 405 (Utah, 1978).

Resort to parol to explain con-

sideration, however, is not allowed where a contractual exchange of
one thing for another is stated.

E.g. Paccagnini v. Bort, 190 N.E. 2d

493 (111. App. 1963): Paloni v. Beebe, 110 P.2d 563 (Utah, 1941).

In

the latter case, neither side is permitted to claim that it should
give less than is stated, or should receive more.

Therefore, where a

search for consideration outside the terms of a document is allowed,
it may not be made among the terms of another document which states a
simple contractual exchange of one thing for another.
The real estate purchase agreement and the limited partnership
agreement in this case are simple contractual exchanges.

Their terms

as to consideration cannot be altered by resort to parol evidence.
The District Court's reliance upon parol evidence in this case cannot
be excused on the theory that it was appropriate to explain that the
consideration for the real estate contract and certificate of limited
partnership, despite their plain written terms, also included the
option.
Respondent's glib claim that the option, the real estate con-
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tract, and the certificate of limited partnership contain "mutual,
overlapping considerations" improperly ignores the plain fact that the
real estate contract and the limited partnership agreement consist of
1 for 1 contractual exchanges which are exclusive of other considerations and contain nothing extra which could "overlap".

Integration
Respondent claims that the real estate contract, limited partnership agreement, and option may be regarded as "integrated", and,
therefore, that consideration for the option can be found in the real
estate contract and the limited partnership agreement.

Respondent

neglects the fact that there is no basis in this record for "integrating" these documents except the theory argued throughout that, taken
together, they constitute a secured loan.
A claim of "integration" in any case does not justify altering
the legal effect of the documents or altering contractual provisions
regarding consideration.

It cannot be denied that unless the option

in this case is regarded as separately bargained cind paid for, as it
appears on its face, and the limited partnership cigreement is regardec
as an exchange of funds for valuable royalties and controlled expenditures, as it appears on its face, the result is to undo the tax
affects which all witnesses agree were the specific and exclusive
basis on which appellants agreed to enter into the subject
transactions.
Respondent also suggests a variant of the "integration1 claim as
a ground for a parol finding of consideration in this case, namely,
that consideration can be found where the option is reserved as a
condition of the sale of realty.

In support of this claim, Respondenl

8

cites statements in American Jurisprudence 2d and an Illinois case
which indicate that where a buyer of land is promised by the seller
that the seller will later repurchase the land at buyerf s option,
buyer can enforce the option (77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser,
§48; Gerald Elbin v. Seegren, 378 N.E.2d 626 (111. 1978); and see
Tilton v. Sterling Coal £ Coke Co., 77 P.758 (Utah, 1904) for dicta
regarding a lessee)), and a Nebraska case which finds that where there
are ample separate payments not otherwise accounted for and it is
shown that the land would not have been sold without the option,
consideration may be found for the option.

Commuter Development and

Investment v. Granlich, 279 N.W.2d 394 (Neb. 1979).
Again, except for Respondent's assumption that the transactions
were a loan, there simply is no evidence in this case that Colman would
not have sold the land without an option back, or that appellants would
have agreed to provide the option except for the promise of $5,000.00.

The "Notes"
Respondent's Brief does not contain an argument why the "notes",
Exhibits "54", "55", and "56", should have been admitted under Rule
106, U.R.C.P., except that Respondent wanted them admitted and claimed
he had nothing more than fragments to offer.

Of course, it cannot be

a response to the requirement of Rule 106 that whole texts be offered
where necessary to make them clear and not misleading merely that the
proponent claims he does not possess the whole text.

Such a claim

simply aborts the rule.
The fact is that the fragments offered by Respondent were incomplete in critical places, and essentially unintelligible.
ents' Brief does not really seem to dispute this.

9

Respond-

Respondent attempt-

ed to draw from them, and attempts in his Brief again to draw from
them, statements which they do not in any clear or complete fashion
contain.

The unreliable and misleading character of the documents

could not be better demonstrated than by producing them.

They are,

accordingly, attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
The District Court clearly relied upon these documents for the
sort of conclusions sought by Respondent, and used them to determine
the credibility of a central witness, William Colman.

This was clear-

ly error, and as it clearly affected the outcome, clearly reversible.

The Appraisal
It was critical to Respondent's case to show that the Anderson
Ranch had a value of $500,000.00 in Fall, 1981.

The only evidence on

this point offered by Respondent, and the evidence specifically relied
upon by the District Court, was a 1971 appraisal which admittedly was
based upon a fundamental misconception that the property was zoned
permissively for development when it was, in fact, zoned restrictive^
against development.
Respondent now coyly attempts to explain away this difficulty by
describing the appraisal as one "assuming zoning approval for development".

There is nothing in the appraisal that suggests such a con-

struction.

It is simply in error about the zoning.

There was no

evidence that any zoning change had ever been sought, or was pending,
or could be.

The uncontradicted evidence was that the appraisal

simply appraised the wrong property.
The Marcellus Palmer appraisal was not an appraisal of the Anderson Ranch which exists, but of a property which the District Court
knew did not exist.

Nevertheless, the District Court specifically
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relied upon the appriasal as the basis for a finding critical to the
judgment.

This finding must be stricken, with the result that the

judgment must be reversed.

The Evidentiary Requirement
This is an action for specific performance.

The agreement to be

specifically performed, however, is not that which appears from the
documents in evidence, namely, that Colman, for $5,000.00, would have
an option on the Anderson Ranch, but a different agreement, namely,
that Colman should have the option without paying the $5,000.00.

The

latter agreement is merely oral, and is found in the "integration" of
the real estate contract, the limited partnership agreement, and the
option on the theory that they were really a secured loan.

That is,

exercise of the option was merely redemption of the security upon
repayment of the loan, and borrower should not be required to pay
separately for the right to redeem.
In an action for specific performance of an oral agreement, or on
a claim that an outright conveyance is in fact security for a loan,
plaintiff must prove his case by clear and convincing evidence which
includes a clear and convincing showing that both parties to the
transaction understood and agreed to the claimed terms.

Corey v.

Roberts, 25 P.2d 940, 942, 547 (Utah, 1933); Clark v. George, 234 P.2d
844 (Utah, 1951); Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah,
1959) .
Respondent's present disavowal of his "loan" theory below effectively admits that the evidence below does not satisfy these requirements.

Even setting aside the objections to parol, and indulging the

District Court's conclusion that Colman was lying, the record is
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devoid of any evidence that anyone but Colman or his attorney regarded
the transactions as a loan, or thought the $5,000.00 for the option
need not be paid.

The evidence that Colman thought such things is

merely negative, and Frank Allen's conclusions about the nature of the
transactions are wholly unsupported by evidence that he heard or
observed anything on the part of appellants inconsistent with their
belief that the transactions were structured exactly as they appear on
their face for real and serious tax purposes.

Allen, in fact, made no

other claim in the latter regard than that he didn't credit appellants1 tax purposes because he didn't understand them.
Respondent asks the Court to read Allen's testimony carefully.
Appellants heartily support this request.

In addition to a remarkable

tendency toward inuendo and to denominate what was obviously reconstruction and speculation with the phrase "recollection", the Court
should observe that Mr. Allen admits that he was not privy to negotiation of the documents (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 43, 93-95), admits that he made
no effort to discern appellant's purposes (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 94-95),
admits that the "instructions" from which he drew his conclusions
about the transactions came from Colman not from appellants (Tr. Vol.
1, pp. 44-45, 49, 63) (with the exception of fixing the closing date
for the land sale and extending the operative date of the option, for
purposes entirely consistent with appellants' testimony) (Tr. Vol. I,
pp. 61-62), admits that he never discussed the $5,000.00 consideration
for the option with anyone (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 154-155), and testified
in direct contradiction of himself on the central issues of date of
execution of the option (compare Tr. Vol. I, p. 137 with Tr. Vol. II,
pp. 170-176), and independent value of the limited partnership interests (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 121-123).
12

When Allen's testimony is considered together with the facts that
the District Court's rationale for disbelief of Colman was the inadmissible "notes", and its only evidence of a value of the Anderson
Ranch consistent with Respondent's claims was an admittedly inaccurate
appraisal, it seems obvious that the evidence in this case supporting
the judgment is not clear and convincing, and does not include anything tending to indicate that appellants ever regarded the option as
a free component of a loan.

Conclusion
The District Court apparently thought it unfortunate that, having
paid $250,000.00 for a property now apparently worth in excess of
$650,000.00, appellants should get to keep the land because of the
"technicality" of failure to pay $5,000.00 for the option.

The pre-

sent judgment is the result.
Appellants may not be denied enforcement of the documents as
written because a bargain eminently fair on its face when made should
appear inequitable in changed economic circumstances years later.

Had

equities been in issue, much might have been presented by appellants
on the inequity of now construing the documents in a manner which
exposes appellants to loss of the tax benefits they bargained for.
No sound evidentiary basis was provided for the District Court's
judgment declining to enforce the documents as written, and instead
enforcing a bargain which all parties to it denied existed.
judgment below must be reversed.
Dated this

^ 7 — day of April, 1987

The

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered ten (10) true
and correct copies of the foregoing Appellants1 Reply Brief to the
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, and that I mailed four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing Appellants1 Reply Brief to
Respondent's attorney at:
L. BRENT HOGGAN
MARLIN J. GRANT
Olson & Hoggan
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Postage pre-paid in Salt Lake City, Utah, this ^^f^j^

Af^A

day of

, 1987.

E. Craig Sma

^

Attorney of Record for Appellants
./

14

